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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the strategic impact on 
the choice between leasing and selling in a duopoly 
market, a generalized model is developed based on the 
Cournot model, we not only consider the substitution 
relationship of two firms’ new products, but also take 
the competitiveness between new products and second-
hand products into account, and we’ve discussed six cases 
respectively under different situations. The results show 
that if two firms simultaneously employ the same pure 
strategy, such as (leasing, leasing) or (selling, selling), 
pure selling strategy turns out to be better than pure 
leasing strategy. However, if one firm chooses pure selling 
strategy while the other chooses pure leasing strategy, 
leasing is the unique dominant behavior. In addition, if 
one firm’s choice is pure strategy, the other’s choice is a 
mix of leasing and selling strategy, pure strategy always 
dominates the mixed strategy except when the proportion 
of selling is sufficiently small.
Key words: Durable products; Leasing strategy; 
Selling strategy
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INTRODUCTION
In the past few decades, selling strategy was always the 
main way for most of the firms that produced durable 
goods to market its products and get profits. The related 
researches also paid much attention to the problems of 
optimal price or producing quantity. However, in recent 
years, selling is not the only way for some firms to get 
profit, a few new marketing strategies becomes very 
popular, such as leasing strategy and the combination 
of leasing and selling strategies, which may be of great 
importance for the firms to get more profits due to the 
changing market and demand environment. 
Taking the automobile industry as an example, after 
a few years development, the leasing vehicles market 
has developed very fast and maturely, especially in the 
North America and Europe. According to the news from 
American Automobile Manufacturers Association in 
2011, the famous leasing companies such as Hertz, Avis, 
and Zipcar in North America as well as Europcar, Sixt in 
Europe, annual profit of them has reached to hundreds 
of millions of euros and the increasing speed is very 
fast. For example, in the first half of 2009, the profit of 
Sixt increased by 12% compared with the same period 
of last year, reached to 82 million euros because of the 
fast development of leasing industry. In Japan, in order 
to continue to capture the good opportunity of increasing 
leasing industry, Toyota launched the Prius plug-in hybrid 
(PHEV) leasing program in 2010, aiming to create new 
market area. Based on above information, it is clear 
that leasing has weakened selling’s dominate role in the 
durable good market, instead, leasing strategy has widely 
accepted by more and more firms. According to this 
phenomenon, some researches have studied this kind of 
problem from several aspects.      
Coase (1972) first pointed out that if there were two 
options (selling and renting) for a monopoly firm to 
market its durable products, its better choice was leasing 
instead of selling, because rational consumers would 
consider that the firm may lower the price in the future 
after a number of consumers bought the durable goods in 
the earlier periods. Bulow (1982) built a two-period model 
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for a monopoly firm, the results showed that the profit of 
selling was obviously less than leasing, the main reason 
was that leasing strategy allowed the manufacture to 
increase the price after a period of time. Bucovetsky and 
Chilton (1986) indicated that monopolist would sell some 
units or improve the durability of its products to stop the 
entry of potential competitors when faced with the threat 
of potential competitors. At this time, selling strategy was 
much better than leasing. Bulow (1986) then built a model 
about the choice of durability when the demand was larger 
than supply, he found that the proportion of leasing and 
selling depended on the number of firms on the market, 
he analyzed that a monopolist was willing to improve the 
durability of new products in order to reduce the products 
quantity of competitors and increase its profits. Besides, 
he suggested that the monopoly should employ a mix of 
selling and leasing strategies for the two periods. Desai 
and Purohit (1999) developed a two-period model of a 
duopoly and found that in equilibrium neither firm leased 
all its units, either they used a mix of leasing and selling 
strategies or they used only selling strategy. Paul (2000) 
proved that when we considered a simultaneous move 
game between two symmetric durable good firms, who 
had the option to choose between renting and selling 
before competing in the product market, selling turned out 
to be the unique dominant behavior of the firms. Agrawal, 
Ferguson, Toktay, Thomas (2012) found that leasing can 
be environmentally worse despite remarketing all off-
lease products and greener than selling despite the mid-
life removal of off-lease products. They also identified 
when educating consumers to be more environmentally 
conscious can improve the relative environmental 
performance of leasing. 
In this paper, we also developed a new two-period 
model in the duopoly environment that evolved from 
Cournot model, but our model is totally different from 
previous two-period models, we have generalized our 
model, which can bring us more realistic and reasonable 
results. Our most interesting finding was that under any 
condition in our generalized model, a mix of leasing and 
selling strategies is never the optimal strategies for the 
manufacture. Pure strategy is always better than mixed 
strategy.
1.  MODEL DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the basic information of our 
model and explain the assumptions about the product, 
manufacture and consumer. In order to better understand 
the marketing issues associated with leasing and selling, 
we take auto industry as our example.
1.1  Product
The product we consider is a durable, in this paper, in 
order to express our model and research problems better, 
we assume that the durable is a car; obviously, other 
durables such as photocopiers, mainframe, mid-range 
computers and smart phones and so on are also good 
examples in durable category. To simplify the analysis, 
we assume a constant marginal cost, c=0, of producing 
a car. Because of the nature the durable products, such 
as car, their life cycle is very long, it seems that multiple 
periods is more realistic for the model, but in order to 
make the model more tractable, we assume that the 
useful life of a car can last two periods. Actually, the 
amount of time is not crucial, it is important to assume 
the life of cars lasts more than one period and they have 
finite lives. In addition, we assume that there are two 
types of car available in the market: new cars and used 
cars. In the first period, there are only new cars existing 
in the market, in the second period, there are both new 
cars and used cars on the market. Because new cars are 
produced and marketed both in the beginning of the first 
period and second period, the cars that are transferred 
from the first period will become used cars in the second 
period.
1.2  Manufacture
There are two manufacturers who manufacture and 
market the identical products in the market with a 
constant marginal cost of c. because the presence of 
positive costs does not affect the nature of our results, we 
set c=0. In addition, the strategies that the manufacturers 
can choose are pure leasing, pure selling and the 
combination of leasing and selling. In the first period, 
the manufacturers sell or lease their new cars while in 
the second period, we assume that they only choose to 
sell the new and used cars. This assumption is reasonable 
because in order to adapt to the diverse and changing 
market demand, the manufacturers will produce new car 
models instead of always producing the same old car 
model after a period of time’s “selling”, so in the second 
period, although the current old car model still produces 
and sells, the manufacturers would rather sell all of them 
than lease the out of fashion cars, because at this time, 
consumers absolutely prefer new car model than the old 
ones. If the manufacturers continue to lease current type 
of car model, after being returned from the consumers 
at the end of contract period, the old car model is 
hardly been sold or disposed due to its out of fashion 
nature, which is bad for the manufacturers total profit. 
According to above reasons, the manufactures will only 
choose to sell their new and old products in the second 
period.
1.3  CONSUMER
We assume that every consumer only buys one car and 
consumers who buy the new cars in the first period 
will hold them for two periods that mean they have the 
ownership of the cars for two periods. The consumers who 
choose to lease the new cars in the first period will return 
the cars to the manufacturers at the end of period one. In 
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this paper, all the consumers we refer to are indifferent 
between buying and leasing and we also don’t divide the 
consumers into rational consumers and myopic consumers 
just like some other papers, consumers choose the way the 
consume only by the economic conditions and personal 
preference. 
Before we analyze our model, some notations should 
be provided. Table 1 explains the meaning of each 
notation.
Table 1 
Summary of Notations 
Parameter Specific meaning
a Capacity of the market
pkij
Price of selling a unit of product, i=1,2, j=new, used, 
k=firm A,B
l kij
Price of leasing a unit of product, i=1,2, j=new, used, 
k=firm A,B
qkij
Quantity of products that manufacturers produced, 
i=1,2, j=new, used, k=firm A,B
δ Substitute coefficient of leasing and selling price in the first period
γ Substitute coefficient of price of new product and used product in the second period
πmnik
Firm’s profit in the second period,i=1,2, k=firm A,B, 
m=selling, leasing, combination, n=selling, leasing, 
combination.
πmnk Total profit of two periods
f proportion of selling
2.  ANALYSIS OF MODEL
There are two manufacturers who manufacture and 
market the identical products in the market. The strategies 
that the manufacturers can choose are pure leasing, 
pure selling and the combination of leasing and selling. 
Two manufacturers compete with each other and they 
have nine kinds of strategy profile, but three of strategy 
combinations are same as other cases, therefore, there 
are only six kinds of strategy profile, which are depicted 
in Table 2. Note that we use “mix” stands for the 
combination of leasing and selling strategy.
Table 2
Strategy Profile of the Two Firms
Case1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 Case 5 Case 6
Firm A Selling Selling Selling Leasing Leasing Mix
Firm B Selling Leasing Mix Leasing Mix Mix
2.1  Firm A Selling and Firm B Selling
In this case, we analyze the case that firm A chooses 
pure selling strategy and firm B also chooses pure selling 
strategy. Then the demand functions of A, B firms in two 
periods are given by:
  
 
, (1)
 
 
. (2)
From the Equations (1) and (2), we can obtain the 
price pA1n, p
B
1n, p
A
2n, p
B
2n, respectively.
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The second period profit of firm A is πSS2A=p
A
2nq
A
2n, 
the firm chooses optimal quantity q*A2n to maximize its 
second period profit by solving the first order condition. 
The second period profit of firm B is πSS2B=p
B
2nq
B
2n the firm 
chooses optimal quantity q*B2n to maximize its second 
period profit by solving the first order condition. Solving 
both firms’ problems simultaneously, q*2A yields q
*
2B.
Then we consider the first period problems. By solving 
the first order condition, firm A chooses optimal quantity 
q*A1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: π
SS
A=π
SS
1Aπ
*SS
2A 
, note that πSS1A=p
A
1nq
A
1n. Meanwhile, firm B chooses optimal 
quantity q*B1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: 
πSSB=π
SS
1Bπ
*SS
2B , note that π
SS
1B=p
B
1nq
B
1n.
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously yields q*1A 
and q*1B. Because the final expressions of q
*
1A and q
*
1B are 
too long (the other five cases are also the same situation), 
we didn’t show them here. In order to capture the 
important managerial insights, we will use the numerical 
study to reflect important results of our model. 
2.2  Firm A Selling and Firm B Leasing
In this case, firm A chooses pure selling strategy while 
firm B chooses pure leasing strategy. Because γ∈(0,1), is 
the substitute coefficient of price of new product and used 
product in the second period, so we reasonably assume 
that pA2u=γp
A
2n, p
B
2u=γp
B 
2n. Note that this assumption also 
suits for the following four cases. Demand functions of A, 
B firms in two periods are given by:
    , (3)
 . (4)
Then we can obtain the price pA1n,  p
B
1n,  p
A
2n,  p
B
2n, 
respectively from Equations (3) and (4).
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The second period profit of firm A is πSL2A=p
A
2nq
A
2n the 
firm chooses optimal quantity q*A2n to maximize its second 
period profit by solving the first order condition. The 
second period profit of firm B is πSL2B=p
B
2nq
B
2n+p
B
2uq
B
1n the 
firm chooses optimal quantity q*B2n to maximize its second 
period profit by solving the first order condition. Solving 
both firms’ problems simultaneously, yields q*2A and 
q*2B. 
Then we consider the first period problems. By solving 
the first order condition, firm A chooses optimal quantity 
q*A1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: π
SL
A =π
SL
1A+ 
π*SL2A, note that π
SL
1A=p
A
1nq
A
1n. Meanwhile, firm B chooses 
optimal quantity q*B1n to maximize its total profit of two 
periods: πSLB =π
SL
1B+ π
*SL
2B , note that π
SL
1B=l
B
1nq
B
1n. Solving both 
firms’ problems simultaneously yields q*1A and q
*
1B.
As shown in Figure 1, the revenue of firm B, who 
chooses pure leasing strategy, is greater than that of 
firm A. This result illustrates if one firm chooses pure 
selling strategy and the other firm chooses pure leasing 
strategy, the pure leasing strategy always dominates pure 
selling strategy when the price between new products and 
second-hand products is closer.
Figure 1 
Manufacturers’ Profit With  Changes
Note. a=100, b1=1, b2=0.9, c1=1, c2=0.9, d1=1, d2=0.9, d3=d4=0.3.
We can also see that as the γ becomes larger, both 
firms revenue increases. The reason is that high second-
hand price leads to the increasing demand of new products 
and the price of new products is much higher than second-
hand price, so the profit of the firm will increase with the 
larger γ.
2.3  Firm A Selling and Firm B Both Leasing and 
Selling
In this case, firm A chooses pure selling strategy while 
firm B chooses combination strategy. Note that δ∈(0,1) is 
the substitute coefficient between lasing price and selling 
price. We assume lB1n=δp
B
1n is reasonable because leasing 
price is always smaller than selling price in practical, 
f stands for the proportion that manufacturer sells his 
products. Demand functions of A, B firms in two periods 
are given by:
  , (5)
. (6)
Then we can obtain the price pA1n,  p
B
1n,  p
A
2n,  p
B
2n, 
respectively from Equations (5) and (6). 
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The second period profit of firm A is πSC2A=p
A
2nq
A
2n, the 
firm chooses optimal quantity q*A2n to maximize its second 
period profit by solving the first order condition. The 
second period profit of firm B is πSC2B=p
B
2nq
B
2n+p
B
2u(1-f)q
B
1n, the 
firm chooses optimal quantity q*B2n to maximize its second 
period profit by solving the first order condition. Solving 
both firms’ problems simultaneously, yields q*2A and q
*
2B.
Then we consider the first period problems. By 
solving the first order condition, firm A chooses optimal 
quantity q*A1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: π
SC
A 
=πSC1A+π
*SC
2A, note that π
SC
1A=p
A
1nq
A
1n. Meanwhile, firm B chooses 
optimal quantity q*B1n to maximize its total profit of two 
periods: πSCB =π
SC
1B+π
*SC
2B, note that π
SS
1B=l
B
1n(1-f)q
B
1n+p
B
1n fq
B
1n.
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously yields 
q*1A and q
*
1B.
As shown in Figure 2, if one firm chooses pure 
selling strategy and the other firm chooses a mix of the 
leasing and selling strategies, pure selling strategy always 
dominates the mixed strategy as the leasing price is 
approaching to the selling price.
Figure 2
Manufacturers’ Profit With  Changes
Note. a=100, b1=1, b2=0.9, c1=1, c2=0.9, d1=1, d2=0.9, d3=d4=0.3, f=0.5, γ=0.7
The figure displays the manufactures’ revenue under 
this case, we can see that with the δ increases, the profits 
of both firms to decreases, it because if δ is close to 1, the 
leasing price is close to selling price , then the quantity 
of firm B’s products becomes less, the profit of firm B in 
the first period will decrease ,when it comes to second 
period, the quantity of firm B’s second-hand products also 
decreases, so the second period’s profit also becomes less, 
the total profit ,therefore, declines with  becomes larger. 
As for firm A, firm B’s higher leasing price leads to the 
larger demand for its new products in the first period, then 
the price of its new products will relatively drop, although the 
selling quantity increases, the long-term profit may decrease.
As shown in Figure 3, if one firm chooses pure selling 
strategy and the other firm chooses a mix of the leasing 
and selling strategies, when the proportion of selling is 
relatively small, the mixed strategy is better than pure 
selling strategy. As the proportion of selling becomes 
larger and closes to 1, pure selling strategy is better than 
mixed strategy. 
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Figure 3  
Manufacturers’ Profit With  Changes
Note. a=100, b1=1, b2=0.9, c1=1, c2=0.9, d1=1, d2=0.9, d3=d4=0.3, γ=0.7, δ=0.6.
The figure displays the manufactures’ profits under 
this case under this case; we can see that if one firm 
chooses to sell all its products and the other firm chooses 
to combine the leasing and selling strategies, both selling 
and leasing strategies dominates pure selling strategy 
when the f is relatively small. As for firm B, the smaller 
the f, the higher the pB2n and p
B
2u so the profit in the second 
period, so the total profit is high when the f is very small.
2.4  Firm A Leasing and Firm B Leasing 
In this case, firm A chooses pure selling strategy while 
firm B also chooses leasing strategy. Demand functions of 
A, B firms in two periods are given by:
   
 
 
, (7)
 
 
 
. (8)
Then we can obtain the price lA1n,  l
B
1n,  p
A
2n,  p
B
2n 
respectively from Equations (7) and (8).
,
,
,
The second period profit of firm A is πLL2A=p
A
2nq
A
2n+p
A
2uq
A
1n, 
the firm chooses optimal quantity q*A2n to maximize its 
second period profit by solving the first order condition. 
The second period profit of firm B is πLL2B=p
B
2nq
B
2n+p
B
2uq
B
1n, the 
firm chooses optimal quantity q*B2n to maximize its second 
period profit by solving the first order condition. Solving 
both firms’ problems simultaneously, yields q*2A and q
*
2B.
Then we consider the first period problems. By 
solving the first order condition firm A chooses optimal 
quantity q*A1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: π
LL
A 
=πLL1A+π
*LL
2A, note that π
LL
1A=l
A
1nq
A
1n. Meanwhile, firm B chooses 
optimal quantity q*B1n to maximize its total profit of two 
periods: πLLB =π
LL
1B+π
*LL
2B , note that π
LL
1B=l
B
1nq
B
1n.
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously yields q*1A 
and q*1B.
As shown in Figure 4, when two firms simultaneously 
choose leasing strategy, the closer between second hand 
price and new product price in the second period, the 
more profit they will get. It should be emphasized that 
when two firms choose same strategy, their profit (the 
competing equilibrium outcomes) are the same. 
Figure 4  
Manufacturers’ Profit With  Changes
Note. a=100, b1=1, b2=0.9, c1=1, c2=0.9, d1=1, d2=0.9, d3=d4=0.3.
The figure displays the manufactures’ profits under 
this case under this case, we can see that as the γ becomes 
larger, the profit of the firms is increasing, it because 
larger γ leads to higher price of second-hand products, 
which in turn increase the demand for new products, so 
the total profit may increase .
2.5  Firm A Leasing and Firm B Both Leasing and 
Selling
In this case, firm A chooses pure leasing strategy while 
firm B chooses both leasing and strategy. Demand 
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functions of A, B firms in two periods are given by:
  ,
.
 (9)
,
.
 
(10)
Then we can obtain the price lA1n,  l
B
1n,  p
A
2n,  p
B
2n 
respectively from Equations (9) and (10).
,
,
,
,
.
The second period profit of firm A is πLC2A=p
A
2nq
A
2n+p
A
2uq
A
1n, 
the firm chooses optimal quantity q*A2n to maximize its 
second period profit by solving the first order condition. 
The second period profit of firm B is πLC2B=p
A
2nq
A
2n+p
A
2u(1-f)
qB1n, the firm chooses optimal quantity q
*B
2n to maximize its 
second period profit by solving the first order condition. 
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously, yields q*2A 
and q*2B. 
Then we consider the first period problems. By 
solving the first order condition firm A chooses optimal 
quantity q*A1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: π
LC
A 
=πLC1A=π
*LC
2A, note that π
LC
1A=l
A
1nq
A
1n. Meanwhile, firm B chooses 
optimal quantity q*B1n to maximize its total profit of two 
periods: πLCB =π
LC
1B=π
*LC
2B , note that π
LC
1B=l
B
1n(1-f)q
B
1n+p
B
1n fq
B
1n.
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously yields 
q*1A and q
*
1B.
As shown in Figure 5, if one firm chooses pure leasing 
strategy and the other firm chooses a mix of the leasing 
and selling strategies, pure leasing strategy always 
dominates the mixed strategy as the second hand price is 
approaching to the selling price.
Figure 5
Manufacturers’ Profit With  Changes
Note. a=100, b1=1, b2=0.9, c1=1, c2=0.9, d1=1, d2=0.9, d3=d4=0.3, γ=0.7, δ=0.6.
The results also show that as the γ is close to 1, both of 
the two firms’ profit are increasing, this because the second-
hand products ‘price becomes high, which means the 
demand of new products in the second period will increase, 
the total profit of both firms will increase with the larger γ.
2.6  Both Firm A and Firm B Adopt Combination 
Strategy
In this case, firm A chooses combination strategy while 
firm B also chooses combination strategy. Demand 
functions of A, B firms in two periods are given by:
 + ,
.
 (11)+
,
.  
(12)
Just as the same solution process of five previous 
cases, we can deduce lA1n, l
B
1n, p
A
1n, p
B
1n, p
A
2n, p
B
2n from 
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Equations (11) and (12), here we won’t repeat the process 
again. 
The second period profit of firm A is πCC2A=p
A
2nq
A
2n+p
A
2u(1-f)
qA1n, the firm chooses optimal quantity q
*A
2n to maximize its 
second period profit by solving the first order condition. 
The second period profit of firm B is πCC2B=p
B
2nq
B
2n+q
B
2u(1-f) 
pB1n, the firm chooses optimal quantity q
*B
2n to maximize its 
second period profit by solving the first order condition. 
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously, yields q*2A 
and q*2B.
Then we consider the first period problems. By 
solving the first order condition firm A chooses optimal 
quantity q*A1n to maximize its total profit of two periods: π
CC
A 
=πSC1A+π
*SC
2A, note that π
CC
1A=l
A
1n(1-f)q
A
1n+p
A
1n f q
A
1n. Meanwhile, 
firm B chooses optimal quantity q*B1n to maximize its total 
profit of two periods: πSCB =π
SC
1B+π
*SC
2B , note that π
SS
1B=l
B
1n(1-f)
qB1n+p
B
1n fq
B
1n.
Solving both firms’ problems simultaneously yields q*1A 
and q*1B.
3.  COMPARISON OF CASES 
This part, we compared six cases based on the same 
parameter values set in chapter 3. We take firm A’s profit 
as an example to express his optimal profit under every 
case.
Table 3 
Firm A’s Profit With the Market Capacity Increase
(A, B) 20 40 60 80 100
(sell, sell) 897.02 3588.08 8073.18 14352.30 22425.50
(sell, lease) 406.50 1626.02 3658.54 6504.06 10162.60
(sell, mix) 520.94 2083.74 4688.42 8334.98 13023.40
(lease, lease) 885.19 3540.75 7966.69 14163.01 22129.70
(lease, mix) 8540.56 34162.20 76865.04 136648.96 213514.00
(mix, mix) 213.51 854.04 1921.59 3416.17 5337.76
Table 3 shows the changes of firm A’s profit under 
six cases when the market capacity  increases. From this 
table, it is interesting to find that if both of two firms 
choose combination of leasing and selling strategy, they 
will get the least profit compared with the other five cases. 
What’s more, if firm A chooses pure leasing strategy 
while firm B chooses a mix of two strategies, firm A will 
achieve highest profit compared with the other five cases. 
But this results raise another issue, if firm A can achieve 
higher profit under this case, firm B will imitates firm A’s 
pure leasing strategy and give up mixed strategy, finally, 
both firm will adopt pure leasing strategy. However, as is 
shown in Table 2, (lease and lease) strategy is not the best 
choice because of lower profit compared with other cases. 
This phenomenon of our results perfectly matches the 
prisoner dilemma.  
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we establish a game model to investigate 
the strategic impact on the choice between leasing 
strategy and selling strategy in a duopoly market. 
Both the substitution of two firms’ new products and 
competitiveness of new and old products are taken 
into account. According to our numerical results, 
some significant results are found. First, if two firms 
simultaneously employ the same pure strategy, pure 
selling strategy turns out to be better than pure leasing 
strategy. Second, if one firm chooses pure selling strategy 
while the other chooses pure leasing strategy, leasing 
strategy always dominates selling strategy. Third, if one 
firm’s choice is pure strategy, the other’s choice is a 
mix of leasing and selling strategy, pure strategy always 
dominates the mixed strategy except when the proportion 
of selling is sufficiently small. Finally, our numerical 
results also proved the insights of “prison dilemma”.
Although we believe that our model helps to explain 
how different strategies can alter the optimal decisions 
of firms. First, it is not without its limitations. In reality, 
we know that the lifecycle of a durable good lasts more 
than two periods. Second, in the future research, multiple 
competitors should be considered. Work is ongoing to 
investigate the problem we didn’t consider in this paper, 
we hope our theoretical work in this paper will help firm 
to make better decision.  
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